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The 1991 Australian coming-of-age film Flirting features a 
central character, Danny Embling (played admirably by Noah 
Taylor), who asks himself before being drawn into a boxing match, 
‘I wondered if my old friend Jean-Paul Sartre would have fought in 
a situation like this’.  Embling climbs into the ring, is duly knocked 
down and is thereupon offered a cigarette by a hallucinatory Sartre, 
ringside but distant from the concerns that had seen Embling laid 
out on the canvas.  
If Embling had read more than Sartre’s philosophical novels, 
and had moved on to Sartre’s Sorel-inspired introduction to Frantz 
Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, he would have had a good 
sense of precisely when and under what circumstances Sartre would 
have seen violence as appropriate. Shifting from his usual 
interrogation of the dialectic between facticity and freedom, Sartre 
laid out a strong endorsement of radically violent subaltern revolt 
against the systemic violence of the coloniser. Discussing the 
Algerians’ turn to violence in the war of decolonisation against the 
French, and Fanon’s defence of it, Sartre maintained that  
this irrepressible violence is neither sound and fury, nor 
the resurrection of savage instincts, nor even the effect 
of resentment: it is man re-creating himself. I think we 
understood this truth at one time, but we have forgotten 
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it — that no gentleness can efface the marks of violence; 
only violence itself can destroy them.
1
 
Such violence, he argued in the best Bakuninite tradition, 
was not merely destructive but also creative. With pre-colonial 
Algeria irrevocably lost and colonial French Algeria collapsing 
under the internal contradictions of liberal imperialism, only 
violence could push history forward in the Maghreb.  
Keen to shield Algerian nationalists from the condemnation 
of the French, Sartre warned of the hypocrisy of metropolitan horror 
in the face of Algerian terrorist violence, declaring to his French 
audience, ‘You, who are so liberal and so humane, who have such 
an exaggerated adoration of culture that it verges on affectation, you 
pretend to forget that you possess colonies and that in them people 
are massacred in your name.’ Going further, Sartre explicitly laid 
the blame for Algerian violence at the feet of the French colonisers. 
Algerian violence was merely the violence of the French returned to 
them by those upon whom it had hitherto been visited:   
This is the age of the boomerang, the third stage of 
violence: it flies right back at us, it strikes us and, once 
again, we have no idea what hit us. The "liberals" remain 
stunned: they admit we had not been polite enough to the 
"natives," that it would have been wiser and fairer to grant 
them certain rights, wherever possible; they would have 
been only too happy to admit them in batches without a 
sponsor to that exclusive club-the human species; and now 
this barbaric explosion of madness is putting them in the 
same boat as the wretched colonists. The metropolitan Left 
is in a quandary: it is well aware of the true fate of the 
"natives," the pitiless oppression they are subjected to, and 
does not condemn their revolt, knowing that we did 
                                                 
1 For Sartre’s introduction, see Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Grove Press, 
New York, 2004, pp.xliii-lxii. 
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everything to provoke it. But even so, it thinks, there are 
limits: these guerrillas should make every effort to show 
some chivalry; this would be the best way of proving they 
are men. Sometimes the Left berates them: ''You're going 
too far; we cannot support you any longer." They don't care 
a shit for its support; it can shove it up its arse for what it's 
worth.
2
 
Of course, the phenomenological Left was not united on this 
score. The pied-noir existentialist Albert Camus wanted no truck 
with Sartre’s endorsement of Fanon’s call for the purgative rigours 
of radical violence. Famously, at the time of his acceptance for the 
1957 Nobel Prize for Literature, Camus reproached those who 
endorsed an ‘ends justifies the means’ ratification of violence in the 
Algeria he knew,
3
 by attempting to re-shift the focus of victimhood 
away from the colonised Algerians onto the French victims of 
Algerian terror, or perhaps most charitably from abstract notions of 
justice towards the corporeal effects of terrorist violence: 'People 
are now planting bombs on the tramway of Algiers. My mother 
might be on one of those tramways. If that is justice, then I prefer 
my mother.'
4
 More radical than this deflection of the question of 
violence, however, was his sense that in endorsing the radical 
violence of Algerians the European Left had capitulated to a force 
that had nothing in common with their own political objectives, but 
which was determined to create an atavistic state purged of all but 
Muslims.
5
   
                                                 
2See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp.xliii-lxii. 
3 For an argument Camus’ Algeria was a literary simulacrum that obscured colonial 
reality, see Emily Apter, ‘Out of Character: Camus's French Algerian Subjects’, Modern 
Language Notes, 112(4), 1987, pp.499-516.  
4 Albert Camus, Algerian Chronicles, (trans A Goldhammer) Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 2013, p.216. On the fallout from the ‘Stockholm Incident’, see Elizabeth 
Hawes, Camus: A Romance, Grove, New York, 2009, p.253 
5 Andrew Hussey, The French Intifada: The Long War Between France and Its Arabs, 
Faber and Faber, New York, 2014, pp.177-178.   
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Hannah Arendt cautioned against Fanon’s, but more 
particularly Sartre’s paean to violence, by inverting Clausewitz’s 
notion that violence was politics conducted by other means. In 
essence, Arendt argued that an authentic ‘political violence’ was 
impossible, given that violence was intrinsically anti-political. For 
Arendt, violence foreclosed the possibility of acting politically, that 
is to say co-operatively. Instead, violence was an artificial 
enhancement and ultimately an abandonment of the political power 
of the violent-prone minority, who recognizing their inability to 
effect change, and opted instead for instrumental force to change 
the prevailing differentials in material strength in their favour. In 
this way, violence, while in extreme times a potential means of 
clearing the ground for the commencement of politics, could not 
itself be political.
6
  
Reading the war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, a bellum 
omnia contra omnes if ever there was one, throws up the same 
question as that posed by the troubled teenager Danny Embling: 
would Sartre fight here? Would he condone fighting? Not on the 
side of the United States and its latest iteration of the ‘coalition of 
the willing’, but on the side of ISIS? Are Salafist jihadists the FLN 
of our generation, the freedom fighters perceived as terrorists by a 
blinkered metropolitan commentariat? This is no mere loose 
provocation, as troubled and untroubled young people the world 
over have packed their bags to fight for the rashly proclaimed 
Islamic Caliphate, inspired by the lure of a rock that is higher than 
they, a foundational metanarrative that can overcome their 
rootlessness, an ideological home, or perhaps simply a testing 
ground. Much has been said about ‘home grown terrorists’ in the 
                                                 
6 Hannah Arendt, On Violence, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1969. For a more detailed 
analysis along these lines, see Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings, ‘On Politics and 
Violence: Arendt Contra Fanon’ Contemporary Political Theory 7, 2008, pp.90–108.  
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stunted pages of the boulevard press (“Mother Asks: Where Did I 
Go Wrong?”), but there remains a certain incomprehension of the 
jihadi who leaves the creature comforts of the West and sneaks 
across the Turkish border into Syria to risk life and limb for the 
new caliphate. Such figures seem a thousand times more motivated 
and ready for radical violence than other objects of metropolitan 
fear, such as their beer-swilling radical right-wing counterparts, 
who in Germany have crystallised under the frank banner of 
‘Hooligans Against Salafists’.7 Not since Spain in the 1930s have 
so many from so far afield taken up arms to fight in what is 
essentially a civil war. While politicians seek ways to confiscate 
their passports or block their return to their countries of origin, the 
historian can only hope they are keeping detailed diaries for 
posterity.   
Unlike amongst Sartre’s Parisian leftist enclaves during the 
Algerian War, there has been no intellectual lionisation of today’s 
jihadists, despite their own claims of being an anti-imperial fighting 
force. What might this mean; have we deafened ourselves to a 
Mesopotamian Fanon or a Levantine Aimé Césaire as a result of 
the pernicious effects of a liberal intellectual consensus after the 
‘end of history’? What public intellectual today would dare offer an 
approving introduction to Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones or the 
collected works of Hasan al-Banna, Abu Musab al-Suri or Abu 
Basir al-Tartusi, brandishing the sword on their behalf as Sartre did 
then? It would be surprising to find any. The dominant line of 
analysis is certainly that of Albert Camus; that it is the innocent 
                                                 
7 The HoGeSa or ‘Hooligans Against Salafists‘; are a uniquely stupid blend of football 
hooligan with the usual suspects of Germany‘s far right scene who have thus far come 
together to drink and riot on the streets of Cologne. See 
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article134122427/HoGeSa-die-Angst-vor-der-
naechsten-Eskalation.html The salonfähig face of contemporary cultural chauvinism in 
Europe might be seen as being represented by as ‘Pegida’ the self-professed ‘Patriotic 
Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West’. 
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victim of subaltern terror – Camus’ mother - who spurs Western 
military action, rather than being the indirect product of it. An 
obsession with not so much the Geneva Conventions (do these still 
exist?) as a sense of what constitutes the Queensbury rules of 
Western warfare has led to a wholesale rejection of jihadist 
insurgency as unbecoming, unseemly and vulgar. The West, it 
might be said, has unsurprisingly rejected subaltern violence not 
because it is opposed to violence – witness the spate of wars in the 
Middle East since the end of the Cold War – but rather on the 
grounds of taste, of their aesthetic combat preferences, which 
prefers a quiet and unobtrusive mass bombing campaign in the 
Levant to a single nail bomb on public transport, a siege in a café 
or a massacre in a press office. The extension of the warzone to 
Western cities and populations has seen any potential sympathy for 
the claims of freedom fighting evaporate. Precisely as Sartre had 
said it would. 
But what of ‘the cause’ and its defenders? On the surface, 
there are certainly some superficial similarities between the 
situation that Sartre and Camus faced and the present one. The 
entire history of neo-imperial violence in the Middle East cannot be 
brushed aside as somehow irrelevant to the current insurgency. 
Like a recalcitrant customer in Colin Powell’s Pottery Barn, the 
United States and its allies (including Australia) deliberately broke 
Iraq, only then to find that they couldn’t afford to pay for the 
damage they caused and were left to slink away from their mess in 
the hope that those who came behind them would sweep up the 
shards. This has proved to be an ineffective strategy for nation 
building. 
 There is also some symmetry to Sartre’s notion of the 
boomerang effect of Western violence in the region. It does not 
take an advanced degree in cultural studies to view the macabre 
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dramaturgy of ISIS’s mode of warfare, with its emphasis on 
ritualistic and very public killings, as a knowingly grotesque 
inversion of the sanitised industrial production of dead bodies 
produced by the impersonal war machine of liberal states. But it is 
not a mere delight in removing the veil of politeness from warfare 
and confronting the West with the actual nature of death in the 
theatre of war that motivates ISIS in its atrocities and war crimes. 
Like Sartre’s Fanon - who differs from Fanon’s Fanon in important 
ways - ISIS uses the ‘purifying’ fires of violence as a rallying point 
for its followers and for the creation of their new polity. By 
committing war crimes, they demonstrate that for them, there is no 
way back.    
But there are other things at play here. As much as the 
assumptions of unlimited Western power would invite critics to 
take all credit for martial or pacific Muslim agency the world over, 
there is far more going on than crude anti-imperialism. The 
tendency to blame Western violence, as blameworthy as it is, for 
everything, strips regional actors of their agency. The few 
experiments with genuine electoral politics in the region (such as 
the 2012 Egyptian election, and the 2006 Palestinian Legislative 
Council election, which admittedly, given their highly complicated 
domestic context cannot be said to speak directly to Syrian and 
Iraqi conditions) have suggested that Islam remains a potent 
political force, particularly in the aftermath of the breakdown of the 
hitherto dominant political order. Arguably, the exclusion of 
political Islam from Middle Eastern political processes can only 
currently be achieved by external or internal coercion, which only 
exacerbates rather than alleviates the social conditions that offer it 
political legitimacy in the eyes of many politically aware Muslims.   
This has long been the case. Few remember who Bashar al-
Assad’s father, Hafez al Assad, steamrollered into oblivion within 
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screaming distance of the Orontian norias of Hama in 1982. It was 
Syria’s insurgent Muslim Brotherhood Islamists (and the hapless 
civilians in their vicinity) who were massacred in the bloody 
crescendo of an ongoing Sunni challenge to the ruling Alawite 
minority who ruled Syria’s secular Ba’athist state. Saddam 
Hussein’s dictatorship over Iraq’s Shi’ite majority (and Kurdish 
minority) was hardly more benign, killing tens of thousands of 
Iraqi Shi’ites after their uprising in 1991.  
Even this does not begin to explain the current militant 
synergies between Iraq and Syria; because (crudely put) Assad’s 
Syria had been oppressing militant Sunnis while Hussein’s Iraq had 
been oppressing militant Shi’ites. The final aligning twist only 
came when the war to find Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction 
came up empty handed but dislodged not only Saddam Hussein, 
but his Sunni Ba’athists, who, having been purged from authority, 
took up arms, many under the banner of Islamic militancy. The 
previously dominant Sunnis now entered a period of self-defence 
from the perceived predations of the US and the newly empowered 
Shi’ite majority, who had forgotten neither who had oppressed 
them nor which techniques had proven most effective in oppressing 
them. Under these conditions, the shift from a discredited 
Ba’athism to Salafism as an ideology of Sunni identity was swift 
and effective.
8
   
In Syria, it took the power vacuum created by the Arab 
Spring (who today speaks of the Arab Spring?) to destabilise 
central Ba’athist power sufficiently to enable anti-regime violence 
to thrive. Unsurprisingly, the military anaemia of the modest Syrian 
liberal opposition quickly gave way to the region’s battle hardened 
                                                 
8 Ali A Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq. Winning the War, Losing the Peace. Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 2007, pp.240-248. 
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jihadists, inexplicably encouraged by Assad as a prophylactic 
against reform.
9
 Unleashed by Assad, and encouraged by Turkey’s 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (who feared Kurdish nationalism more than 
Sunni radicals), ISIS promptly bit the hand that had fed it. 
Meanwhile, Iran, with its long porous border with Iraq threw its 
weight behind the Shia resistance to ISIS in Iraq as well as doing 
what it could to prop up Assad in Syria through its Hezbollah 
proxy.
10
 Assad has also enjoyed the generous support of Putin’s 
Russia, which for reasons that have everything to do with Russia’s 
domestic ‘Muslim question’ feels far more comfortable with 
secular dictators than Islamist insurgents. Entering into this 
quagmire (despite Barack Obama’s insistence that the dominance 
of their military hammer did not mean that ‘every problem is a 
nail’),11 the US created yet another ‘coalition of the willing’, this 
time initially supporting the Kurdish resistance against ISIS (much 
to the chagrin of Turkey), but slowly insinuating ‘military 
advisers’. At the same time, the US had to find the correct form of 
words to obscure the fact that this saw them become proxy brothers 
in arms with Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad. The US has also had 
to try and stop Turkey from bombing the fervently anti-ISIS (but 
PKK aligned) Kurdish peshmerga, whose autonomy in Northern 
Iraq and Syria is, again, seen by Turkey as a far more lasting threat 
than a transient ragtag ISIS caliphate.   
                                                 
9 For Assad’s initial support of the jihadists, see Lina Khatib, ‘Assad's fatal strategic 
mistakes’ http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/al-assad-fatal-strategic-
mistak-201432910353132476.html  
10 On Hezbollah’s role in the region, see 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/hezbollah-leader-delivers-
defiant-speech/2014/11/04/5da02d85-6ef0-4abc-afd0-
4d3aa28ed0d6_story.html   
11 For Obama’s short-lived non-interventionist foreign policy doctrine, see 
http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/inside-
story/articles/2014/5/28/intervention-vs-
isolationwhatwillbeobamasforeignpolicylegacy.html  
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If causality, motivation and catalyst for political violence in 
post Ba’athist Iraq and Syria all seem terribly complex that is 
because they are. As in the final days of French Algeria, the old 
world of Ba’athist Syria and Iraq has died, but a new world has yet 
to be born. But that is where the similarities stop. Unlike Sartre’s 
all too neat view of the war between France and a monolithic FLN 
(which in itself was a much looser coalition of different forces than 
Sartre ever let on), ISIS and its adherents cannot be viewed through 
the Manichaean lens of the putatively heroic struggle of the 
subaltern against the coloniser. Rather it should be seen as 
kaleidoscopic warfare, where the geostrategic aims of the US in the 
post Ba’athist countries of Syria and Iraq are pitted not only against 
the crumbling state militaries of those countries, but also against 
those of newly emboldened state players such as post-Kemalist 
Turkey, post-revolutionary Iran, and neo-interventionist Russia, as 
well as against the priorities of players aspiring to state status, such 
as the nationalist Kurds,  and the transnational, post-al Qaeda 
jihadists of ISIS and other assorted militias. This is a situation in 
which the various players are operating on the assumption that 
there is no right or wrong, only interests and the zero-sum means of 
realising them at the expense of the other players.  
To return to the original conundrum, of whether or not to 
fight, it would seem that viewing ISIS as a ‘classic’ force for 
decolonisation and liberation would be a serious error. Sartre might 
have had cogent reasons for supporting the end of colonialism in 
Algeria, but ISIS in the Levant and Mesopotamia, with its 
commitment to a hyper-religious, highly authoritarian state is not 
the same beast as the notionally socialist FLN. Even the most 
strenuous strain of revolutionary wishful thinking would struggle to 
find common cause with the theocratic fantasies of ISIS. Why 
would anyone, much less the remnant left, support such messianic 
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vanguardism? Built on secular materialism and having spent a 
century divesting itself of the theological straitjacket of Leninism 
and more than two centuries carefully filleting the metaphysical, 
pseudo-progressivism of the Weltgeist from the Hegelian corpus, 
why would anyone entertain the teleology offered by the supporters 
of the latest möchtegern Caliphate? ISIS may not be merely an 
‘apocalyptic death cult’ (there are important material interests that 
matter to ISIS too),
12
 but it is certainly not an unproblematic force 
for regional decolonisation. So to be clear: there is nothing that 
ISIS offers that could be supported on the grounds offered by 
Sartre for supporting Algerian nationalists.  
That said, any decision to support those militarily opposing 
ISIS – the Kurdish peshmerga, Hezbollah, the United States and its 
coalition of the willing, the Russian-backed Assad government of 
Syria, the Shia-dominated government of Iraq – should be aware 
that they too carry with them not merely a set of ideological 
assumptions, but are also serving broader material interests of their 
own, and that these actions have long term ramifications for an 
already highly dynamic region. There is no Archimedean point 
from which purposive, apolitical military assistance to those on the 
‘right side of history’ can be coolly offered. Some of the interests 
being fought for are arguably laudable; the preservation of Kurdish 
autonomy (which might, however, destabilise Turkey), the 
protection of Yazidi and Christian minorities (which might have 
been done more effectively through humanitarian channels such as 
the UNHCR). But even these aims constitute a negative agenda, in 
the sense that fighting ISIS serves only the short term problem of 
defeating a particular incarnation of jihadi radicalism. Witness the 
                                                 
12 For Tony Abbott’s assessment of ISIS, see 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/tony-abbott-intensifies-rhetoric-about-
isis-calling-it-an-apocalyptic-death-cult  
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sudden re-emergence of Al Qaeda in Yemen, or the rise of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria. How many more Osama Bin Ladens, springing 
from a seemingly inexhaustible Hydra’s head, must US Navy Seals 
shoot before regional structural choices regarding the relationship 
between politics and Islam (or Islam as politics) are stabilised? The 
current military campaign deliberately leaves open (must leave 
open) the longer term geostrategic future of Iraq and particularly 
Syria, where the choices seem to be between the religious war 
criminals of the Islamic Caliphate, the secular war criminals of the 
Assad regime or an imposed ‘Western’ government that could 
survive only through the garrisoning of the region with hundreds of 
thousands of troops for a generation – an imperial option that 
Afghanistan has demonstrated can also end at best inconclusively.    
The choices are all unsavoury. This is where Žižek, the 
Pagliacci of the Left, seems correct, when he argues against the 
imperative to intervene senselessly: 
 Better to do nothing than to engage in localised acts the 
ultimate function of which is to make the system run 
more smoothly… The threat today is not passivity, but 
pseudo-activity, the urge to ‘be active’, to ‘participate’, 
to mask the nothingness of what goes on. People 
intervene all the time… The truly difficult thing is to 
step back, to withdraw.
13
 
This is not an argument for quietism or pacifism, which 
equally erroneously propose to do nothing on principle. Unless the 
act is more than an empty signifier, however, a towering and 
violent gesture of helplessness, then it should be left undone. 
Anything else would be simply the politics of Sartrean mauvaise foi 
– bad faith – at the level of the state, where states act more or less 
knowing what they’re fighting against, but with no idea what 
                                                 
13 Slavoj Žižek, Violence, Profile Books, London, 2009, p.183.  
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they’re fighting for. And, as Camus sought to reminds us, military 
violence is not the sum of all potential action. Instead, a structural 
critique might be mounted that is not merely ‘a plague o’ both your 
houses!’ but constructively establishes a path between the 
homicidal irrationality of radical jihadism and the Western 
fantasies of imposing a totalising liberal world order. Once again, it 
is Žižek who has begun this process, arguing that ‘fundamentalism 
is a reaction – a false mystification of course – against a real flaw 
in liberalism which will continue to generate new fundamentalisms. 
As such, left to itself, liberalism will slowly undermine itself.’14 
This is a start, but it still pays insufficient heed to the intricacy of 
local dynamics that intersect with and corrode the more obvious 
global structuring factors. Still, as he at least makes clear, 
repudiating ISIS and Al Qaeda’s claims to be fighting for the 
Muslim subaltern (who has more than enough cause for complaint) 
does not necessitate an endorsement of the overarching logic which 
underpins the West’s renewed entanglements in the Middle East 
any more than it requires an endorsement of the geostrategic 
ambitions of Iran, Russia, China, Turkey or any other party.   
The question of whether to fight, to deploy violence (or as it 
is generally described ‘to intervene’) from afar in an ostensibly 
civil war cannot be decided on principle, but rather on the given 
situation. In Iraq and Syria the situation is far from conclusive in 
terms of precisely what action it demands and what ends action 
might serve. Sartre’s Manichaean introduction to Fanon’s The 
Wretched of the Earth offers us no real guide for action in this zone 
of kaleidoscopic warfare, any more than does the West’s 
Manichaean understanding of ISIS as a nihilistic death cult devoid 
of a material political agenda. Yet, as the existentialist Simone de 
                                                 
14 Slavoj Žižek, “Der Liberalismus braucht der Linke” http://www.taz.de/Slavoj-iek-
ueber-Charlie-Hebdo/!153100/, last viewed 20.01.2015.  
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Beauvoir illustrates, the facticity of the given situation can be 
overcome through authentic political choices that move beyond 
servitude to secular or religious metanarrations that claim to have 
uncovered and serve the telos of history. Correctly, Beauvoir insists 
upon the centrality of choice, not merely between binary forms of 
action, either ‘for or agin’, but rather whether to act or not to act.15 
In the abstract, this is the process of embracing an authentic 
political freedom that refuses false binaries. In concrete terms, it is 
an injunction not to fight simply because there is a fight to be had.  
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